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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1950s, a series of articles, comments, and case notes
appeared in American law reviews dealing with the then-current law
relating to severance of joint tenancies.' It is not too much to say that
©Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
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1. See Paul Basye, Joint Tenancy: A Reappraisal, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 504, 507
(1955)(describing the four unities ofjoint tenancy as "an outstanding example of
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they echoed a single theme: The inherited law of severance was based
upon a needless and outmoded formalism. The commentators con-
cluded that the law of severance of joint tenancies had become "thor-
oughly burdened with concepts which might be described as archaic." 2
In their eyes, the "troublesome doctrine of the four unities"3 stood
out as the worst offender. These four unities-time, title, possession,
and interest-were traditionally used to decide whether there had
been a severance. Unless they were broken, there could be none. That
requirement seemed a particularly egregious example of the harm
done by taking a purely formal approach to legal questions. It served
to frustrate the legitimate expectations of too many joint tenants, and
for no discernible purpose. To the commentators, the time seemed
ripe for American courts to take a more realistic stance and to aban-
don the four unities outright. They advocated that courts look instead
to the intent of the parties for the operative test of whether a joint
tenancy had been severed and a tenancy in common created in its
place.
In the years since the 1950s, the intent-based approach advocated
by the law review commentators has been noted, mostly with approba-
tion, in treatises, 4 law reviews,5 hornbooks,6 and casebooks. 7 What
persisting medieval formalism"); Londo H. Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Owner-
ship of Real Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 227 (1961)(stating
that the four unities requirement is "outmoded and has no place in modem law");
John Mann, Joint Tenancies Today, 1956 ILL. L. FORUM 48, 75 (describing the
joint tenancy as "a technical common law estate, full of pitfalls for the unwary
and uninformed"); Elmer M. Million et al., Real and Personal Property, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 357, 381 (1961)(noting with approval the development of an intent-based
test according to discussions "during the past seven years"); Frank Reichelderfer,
Severance of Joint Interests, 1959 ILL. L. FORUM 932, 934-35 (showing need for
the use of a straw man to sever); Robert W. Swenson & Ronan E. Degnan, Sever-
ance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. REV. 466, 503 (1954)(arguing that the uni-
ties may have had a purpose historically "but are useless concepts today"); Leland
Stuart Beck, Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154, 159 (1955)("The intention of the parties
should be controlling, and the function of the court is to seek out that intention.");
Note, Effect of Contract to Sell, 42 IOwA L. REV. 646, 648-49 (1957)(criticizing
recent decision as contrary to the better rule that would "hold intention to be the
primary test for severance," as was true for creation); Edward H. Hoenicke, Com-
ment, Elimination of the Straw Man in the Creation of Joint Estates in Michigan,
54 MICH. L. REV. 118, 120 (1955); George W. Marti, Note, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1194,
1195 (1957); Harold J. Romig, Jr. & John M. Shelton, Comment, Severance of a
Joint Tenancy in California, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 290, 298 (1957).
2. Swenson & Degnan, supra note 1, at 466.
3. Hoenicke, supra note 1, at 120.
4. See e.g., 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 618[3] (Patrick J.
Rohan ed., 1997); 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 31.09 (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 402.[2] [c] [ii] (Arthur R. Gaudio ed.,
1991).
5. See e.g., Severing Joint Property Interests, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 435,
442-46 (1981). But see Samuel M. Fetters, An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret
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has not been undertaken is any investigation of whether the case law
itself has responded to the position taken in the articles. Academics
issued a strong call for a more realistic approach to be used in deciding
severance cases. But has any court answered their call?
At first sight, it appears that they have not. Judges and commen-
tators today continue to speak of the four unities and the formalist
approach they embody as stating the law applied in the majority of
American jurisdictions.8 The arguments advanced in the law reviews
during the 1950s seem to have fallen upon deaf ears. The task of the
present Article is to discover whether that conclusion is correct.
The Article also contributes to the discussion of the place of formal-
ism in the law.9 The relevance of the questions raised is not limited to
the subject of joint tenancies. Underlying the approach advocated in
most of the early law review commentary is the conviction that purely
formal norms that are out of step with current realities should be
eliminated from the law wherever they can be. Taking that approach
seriously has real, and continuing, implications in many areas of the
law, and it is a subject on which many writers have strong views. The
commentary from the 1950s was an eloquent statement of one possible
consequence of taking the anti-formalist view. Within this particular
area of law, and in a forceful way, it raised a large subject which was
of significant interest to legal scholars and, indeed, to all thoughtful
lawyers.
Destruction of Joint Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FoRDHAM L. REV. 173, 197-
201 (1986).
6. See e.g., ROGER A. Cu NNIGHAm ErT AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.4, at 200 (2d ed.
1993); CORNELIUS MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 212
(2d ed. 1988).
7. See e.g., JESSE DUIKmNIER & JA~ms E. KRIER, PROPERTY 341 (3d ed. 1992);
GRANT NELSON ET AL., CoNTEAnoRARY PROPERTY 314 (1996).
8. See JOHN CRIBBEr ET AL., PROPERTY 319 (7th ed. 1990)(criticizing the result as
"hardly comprehensible to a layman," but describing the four unities as "widely
current" and noting that the alternative of doing without them "has not been
widely adopted"); see also RALPH BOYER ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY: AN INTRO-
DUCTORY SURvEY 101-02 (4th ed. 1991); ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND WERNER,
REAL ESTATE LAw § 14.02(b)(1) (8th ed. 1983).
9. See, e.g., Symposium, Legal Formalism, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 579 (1993).
The scholarly literature on this subject is now voluminous. A good introduction,
which has a kind word to say about formalism, is Frederick Schauer, Formalism,
97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). For further helpful discussion, see Daniel A. Farber,
The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law,
45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
179 (1986); Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning
and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REv. 119 (1985); Robert S. Summers, The Formal




Joint tenancies and tenancies in common exist where estates in
land or rights to chattels are held as a unit by two or more persons.
The former are distinguished from the latter by the characteristic, tra-
ditionally called the ius accrescendi, which makes the joint tenant who
survives the death of the other(s) the outright owner of all the prop-
erty. Property held in common, by contrast, passes to each tenant's
heirs or legatees. It is quite possible to move from a joint tenancy to a
tenancy in common while retaining the other features of co-ownership.
In fact, either tenant has the right to sever the joint tenancy, even
without the consent or knowledge of the other tenant, and such a sev-
erance ends the ius accrescendi. However, it does not upset the undi-
vided ownership in the tenancy in common that is created when
severance occurs. Only a partition, accomplished by sale or physical
division of the property, results in the parties holding separate inter-
ests in the property.
Although by no means legally so confined, joint tenancies are typi-
cally used by husbands and wives, or at least by members of the same
family. Ties of kinship often create an interest in property that is joint
in more than a technical sense, and this form of ownership accords
well with those ties. It also permits the survivor to take by virtue of
the original conveyance, rather than by inheritance at the death of the
other tenant(s); very often this result is exactly what members of the
same family desire. Among other advantages, joint tenancy avoids the
expense and trouble of probate. Consequently, it would not be inaccu-
rate to say that the joint tenancy is most widely used today as an al-
ternative to a will.
The common law joint tenancy is very old, going back at least to
the thirteenth century.lo In its main features, it has exhibited a re-
markable durability. As the preferred form of common ownership in
earlier English law, the joint tenancy's existence was presumed over a
tenancy in common in cases where there was doubt about which had
been created. Despite widespread reversal of that presumption in
modern American law, joint tenancies remain in frequent use. In-
deed, there is some evidence to suggest that their popularity is actu-
ally growing."1
10. See 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 271-72 (George Woodbine
ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans. 1977); Anne L. Spitzer, Joint Tenancy with Right of
Survivorship: A Legacy from Thirteenth Century England, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV.
629 (1985).
11. See Yale B. Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 88 & n.4 (1961)(noting that "joint tenancy is the usual way of taking title
in California"); N. William Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law,
Fact and Fancy, 54 MrNN. L. REV. 509, 512-13 & nn.14-18 (1970)(citing author's
prior empirical studies); Robert L. Merricks, Joint Estates in Real Property in
West Virginia, 61 W. VA. L. REV. 101, 101 (1959)(estimating that 90% of the deeds
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The traditional test for the creation and continuation of a joint ten-
ancy depended upon the presence of the four unities. Unless the uni-
ties of time, title, interest, and possession existed at the tenancy's
inception, or if they were broken at any subsequent point, the joint
tenancy was automatically severed, and the owners became tenants in
common. This requirement meant, for example, that the owner of
property could not create a joint tenancy in himself and others without
first making use of a straw man. Because all joint tenants had to re-
ceive their interest in the property at the same time and by the same
title, the owner had first to convey to a third party, who would in turn
convey the property back to the grantor and the other tenants. They
would then take in joint tenancy. Without this purely formal step,
however, they would be only tenants in common.
Today (as was already largely true in the 1950s), the necessity for
using a straw man to create a joint tenancy has been largely elimi-
nated from American law, sometimes by judicial decision12 but more
often by statutory enactment.1 3 However, the situation as to termina-
tion of a joint tenancy has not been identical. In order to sever, the
traditional rule has always required either that all the tenants make
an express agreement to hold as tenants in common or that one of the
tenants convey to a third person in order to destroy the unities. This
recorded in the state's populous counties convey to both husband and wife and
that 90% of these deeds create joint tenancies); Robert R. Moodie, Some of the
Dangers of Joint Tenancy, 29 NEB. L. REv. 235, 235 (1950)(estimating that more
than 50% of recorded conveyances of that time in Nebraska were in joint ten-
ancy); cf. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HAxv. L. REv. 1108, 1114-15 (1984)(discussing the common
use of joint tenancies as imperfect will substitutes).
Moreover, some states that once forbade the creation of joint tenancies have
now come to permit them. The common law joint tenancy, abolished by the Geor-
gia Consititution of 1777, was revived by statute in 1976. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-
190 (1976). In Washington state, the joint tenancy was abolished by statute in
1885 but reinstituted by popular initiative in 1961. See WASH. REv. CODE
§ 64.28.010 (1989). The similar history of the law of North Carolina is traced in
John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C.
L. REv. 491 (1991). A survey of current state law on this subject is found in 4
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at § 31.06(d).
12. See e.g., Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1938) noted in Recent
Case, 23 MmN. L. Rav. 385, 385-86 (1939); see also Ratinska v. Estate of
Denesuk, 447 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(stating that no purpose is
served by "requiring that property be conveyed twice when a single conveyance is
just as effective and has the virtues of economy and efficiency"); Switzer v. Pratt,
23 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1946)(agreeing with the rule that "the intention of the
parties should prevail over the technical common law rules"); Lipps v. Crowe, 100
A.2d 361, 364 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953)(stating that "[ilf ajoint tenancy can
be created between or among persons by means of a conveyance through third
persons, it can be created by direct conveyance").




means that, although any joint tenant has the unqualified right to
sever the tenancy, thereby creating a tenancy in common in which the
ius accrescendi disappears, if the joint tenant wishes to do so and con-
tinue to hold in common, he must first make use of the straw man.
Otherwise, the four unities will not have been destroyed. The law re-
view commentators found that requirement as incongruous as it was
archaic. Indeed, its purely formalist approach seemed to have infected
the law of severance at several points. They advocated its abolition.
Calling for replacement of this formalist approach, commentators ar-
gued that the intent of the parties should control.
III. CONTINUING CITATION OF THE FOUR UNITIES
An initial examination of the cases decided in the intervening
years tempts one to believe that nothing has changed in the interim.
The four unities appear to occupy a central place in many judicial deci-
sions. What judges have written often gives no hint that they have
paid the slightest heed to the argument that the requirement has out-
lasted any utility it may once have had. The four unities continue to
be described as necessary parts of a joint tenancy. A Missouri case
from the 1950s saw fit to stress that a joint tenancy's "essential ele-
ments are the four unities of interest, title, time and possession."'14 A
Pennsylvania case of 1991 used almost exactly the same language-
"the four unities of a joint tenancy"-to distinguish it from a tenancy
by the entirety. 15 In a 1983 case from West Virginia, the court spoke
approvingly of "the four unities that are essential to the creation and
maintenance of a joint tenancy."'6 And in a decision from the District
of Columbia in 1996, the judge held that "joint tenancy cannot exist
unless there be present unity of interest, title, time and posses-
sion. . "'17 Such statements recognizing the vitality of the unities
are common. Although repudiated in a few jurisdictions, the rule that
continued existence of the four unities is the necessary feature of the
joint tenancy appears to be alive and well in many others.
A more thorough examination of these cases gives good reason for
not drawing far-reaching conclusions based upon the various courts'
mention of the four unities. Each of the four cases just cited arose
under circumstances where there were substantive reasons, not sim-
ple formalism, for reaching a result in line with the four unities test.
In none of the cases would a strict application of the four unities have
required disregarding the intent of the joint tenants. The Missouri
case involved a dispute over state inheritance taxation, and the four
14. G.H. Suelthaus v. State (In re Gerling), 303 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1957).
15. Riccelli v. Forcinito, 595 A.2d 1322, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
16. Herring v. Carroll, 300 S.E.2d 629, 633 (W. Va. 1983).
17. In re Estate of Gulledge, 673 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C. 1996)(quoting Harrington v.
Emmerman, 186 F.2d 757, 760 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
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unities were invoked to stress that the survivor took by the original
conveyance, not by way of inheritance from the first to die.18 The
Pennsylvania case used language approving the four unities simply to
make the obvious point that marriage by one joint tenant did not nec-
essarily sever a tenancy between him and another person. 19 In the
West Virginia case, one party had argued that the unities "must be
deemed to be legislatively abolished,"20 and that, consequently,
neither tenant had a right to sever the tenancy and create a tenancy
in common. The court used the four unities to hold that this proposi-
tion was not the law; either tenant retained the power to sever by de-
stroying one or more of the unities. Similarly, in the case from the
District of Columbia, one party sought to sever by conveying her inter-
est to a third person. The court upheld her intention by noting that
her act had "destroyed the unities of title and time."21
These four cases represent the pattern of the American decisions in
the intervening years. The four unities continue to be invoked, but
not where they would make a difference in the outcome. 22 Sometimes,
the four unities have been mentioned in dicta, where the reference
was superfluous to the court's decision.23 Other times, they have been
mentioned in dissent, to protest against a majority opinion dispensing
18. See G.H. Suelthaus v. State (In re Gerling), 303 S.W.2d at 915, 918 (Mo. 1957).
For an analogous though unusual case, holding that the survivor took by virtue of
the original grant, which involved the proceeds to property intentionally burned
by one joint tenant, who also committed suicide, see Felder v. North River Ins.
Co., 435 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
19. Riccelli v. Forcinito, 595 A.2d 1322, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
20. Herring v. Carroll, 300 S.E.2d 629, 633 (W. Va. 1983).
21. In re Estate of Gulledge, 673 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C. 1996).
22. One possible exception to this generalization is the involuntary levy on one joint
tenant's interests by a creditor. In these cases, the four unities sometimes have
been used as a way to uphold the rights of the surviving joint tenant where the
debtor-joint tenant dies before the property can be sold. See, e.g., Knibb v. Secur-
ity Ins. Co., 399 A.2d 1214, 1216-17 (R.I. 1979)(observing that the levy of execu-
tion did not destroy the four unities and, therefore, did not sever the joint
tenancy). However, similar cases have been decided in the same way without
reference to the four unities. See, e.g., Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v.
Knopp, 246 N.W.2d, 612,613-14 (N.D. 1976)(holding that a judgment lien against
ajoint tenant's interest in real property is not by itself sufficient to sever the joint
tenancy since the surviving joint tenant does not take the deceased tenant's in-
terest but rather has a vested interest in the whole by virtue of the original con-
veyance). In such cases, the intent of the joint tenant cannot, of course, be
dispositive, because his consent is irrelevant to the nature of the action taken
against him. See John Fisher, Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien After
Death?, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 637 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Neaderhiser v. State Dept. of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 673 P.2d, 462, 464-
65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. 1990); Koster v.
Boudreaux, 463 N.E.2d 39, 43, 44 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Merrick v. Peterson, 606
P.2d 700, 705 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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with the traditional unities.24 Occasionally, the four unities have
rated a passing word as a largely historical curiosity.25 Rarely, how-
ever, has the requirement furnished the operative rule of decision in
litigation. There are exceptions to this generalization which will be
discussed below, but, in the main, the four unities have been used in
these cases simply to reach an outcome that would also have been
reached by enforcing the intent of the parties or applying some other
legal rule.
Significantly, references to the four unities in cases where one of
the tenants had conveyed his interest to a stranger to the title and
thereby severed the joint tenancy have been a particularly frequent
feature of the judicial opinions of recent years.26 In virtually all such
instances, it made no difference to the outcome whether an intent-
based or the traditional test was adopted, since the joint tenant who
conveyed away his interest clearly wished to terminate the survivor-
ship feature of the tenancy. Courts have quite sensibly cited both
tests where no inconsistency between them existed. Such an approach
is far from the archaic formalism that was the target of the original
commentary.
The relative harmlessness of this formal requirement's continued
use is further illustrated by cases in which courts have held that some
action short of outright conveyance by one of the tenants did not sever
the joint tenancy. Some of these decisions supported this result by
mentioning the continued existence of the four unities. However, they
did so only in order to uphold the intent of the joint tenant not to de-
stroy the survivorship rights. Thus, where one tenant pledged his in-
terest in the property to a stranger or otherwise made a temporary
grant of the property without intending that the interest serve as any-
thing but a security interest, courts have occasionally taken note of
the continued existence of the four unities. Doing so provides an easy
way to uphold that tenant's intent to continue the joint tenancy de-
spite the pledge or grant.2 7 These judges were not using the four uni-
24. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank v. Demiris, 354 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1960)(Ellett, J., dis-
senting); Lyon v. Lyon, 670 P.2d 272, 276 (Wash. 1983)(Dolliver, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Studstill, 306 S.E.2d 633, 636 (Ga. 1983).
26. See Re v. Re, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 64-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Harelik v. Tashoney,
337 So. 2d 828, 828-29 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Brown, 753 P.2d 1299, 1301-01 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988); Alexander v. Boyer,
253 A.2d 359, 361, 364-65 (Md. 1969); Shackelton v. Sherrard, 385 P.2d 898, 899,
901 (Okla. 1963); General Credit Co. v. Cleck, 609 A-2d 553, 554, 556-57 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992); Hoover v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 498 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); Jones v. Conwell, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64-65 (Va. 1984).
27. See Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 582 P.2d 215, 218-19, 221 (Idaho 1978);
Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208, 212-13 (Md. 1992); see also Grothe v. Cor-
tlandt Corp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 39-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Home Trust Mercan-
tile Bank v. Staggs, 714 S.W.2d 792, 793-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Estate of
Kotz, 406 A.2d 524, 528, 531-32 (Pa. 1979). But see Hutchinson Natl Bank and
[Vol. 77:1
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ties to upset the wishes of the parties. In fact, the reverse is closer to
the truth. More often than not, judges have invoked the four unities
to protect those wishes.
IV. REJECTION OF THE FOUR UNITIES REQUIREMENT
Besides the cases just described in which the formalist approach
produced the same result as an intent-based approach, appreciable
numbers of cases have arisen in which it did make a real difference
which approach was adopted. In the great majority of these cases, and
in virtually all those dealing with the specific problems taken up in
the commentary of the 1950s, the courts have rejected the four unities
requirement. They have instead adopted a more realistic approach to
the question. They have followed the view expressed in the law review
commentary that intent should control.28
Of course, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the absolute prepon-
derance of the intent-based approach. The judicial response has not
been unanimous. There have indeed been cases holding that the ques-
tion of severance must be determined by looking solely at the four uni-
ties. But, although the existence of such cases is worth noting, surely
it is more significant that they have been few in number. A trend does
not cease to be a trend simply because there have been exceptions to
it. Moreover, many jurisdictions have not decided one way or the
other. Nonetheless, we would probably do well to hesitate before
describing the traditional approach as "the majority rule" in view of
the paucity of recent case law to support that conclusion. A survey of
the decisions on the subject during the past forty years (of which there
have been many) leaves one with the distinct sense of the traditional
approach's substantive irrelevance. The evidence on the point falls
roughly into one of three distinct classes.
A. Cases of Unilateral Self-conveyance
The starkest clash between the formalist and the intent-based ap-
proaches has come in cases in which one joint tenant has conveyed to
him or herself as a tenant in common. Without joining or informing
the other joint tenant(s), one of them seeks unilaterally to eliminate
the ius accrescendi by converting the title into a tenancy in common.
It has never been doubted that one tenant can sever a joint tenancy by
conveying to a third person. But can one tenant achieve the same re-
sult simply by conveying, as a joint tenant, to him or herself as a ten-
Trust Co. v. Brown, 753 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988)(finding severance
from a unilateral pledge).
28. See generally Beck, supra note 1, at 159 (stating that "[t]he intention of the par-




ant in common? Or can the tenant sever simply by making a formal
declaration of intent to do so? Under traditional law, neither the uni-
lateral self-conveyance nor the formal declaration disturbed the four
unities. Both were therefore ineffective in severing the joint ten-
ancy.2 9 It is doubtful, however, that this remains the law today.
The first outright rejection of the traditional approach to severance
appeared in a Minnesota case.3 0 One joint tenant executed a "Decla-
ration of Election to Sever Survivorship of Joint Tenancy" without the
knowledge of the other tenant. Then he died. When this "Declara-
tion" was challenged by the surviving joint tenant, who claimed title to
the whole, it was held that the "Declaration" had in fact served as an
effective severance. 31 A tenancy in common had resulted. The case
was complicated slightly by the fact that the property held in joint
tenancy was a homestead, 3 2 but the court's holding was not limited to
such property. The opinion stated clearly that thereafter one tenant
could "terminate the joint tenancy by declaration without being re-
quired to go through the ceremony of a conveyance to a straw man and
a reconveyance back again."3 3
In the years that followed, several other courts have taken the
same step. The most dramatic occurred in California in 1980.34 Only
twelve years previously, the same court had held unambiguously that
any transfer of property required two different people, a grantor and
grantee. Hence no severance could be effected by one joint tenant's
conveying to herself.35 The 1980 case rejected this then-recent prece-
dent, deciding instead to "discard the archaic rule that one cannot en-
29. ROBERT NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY § 2.8 at 34-35
(1992)(said to be the rule "in most states").
30. See Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 690-91
(Minn. 1968).
31. Id. at 691.
32. Under Minnesota law, homestead property could not be alienated or mortgaged
without the consent of both spouses. The traditional method of severance by con-
veyance and reconveyance was therefore not open to the joint tenant desiring to
sever, so he chose to execute the Declaration described in the case. In recognizing
an effective severance, the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed out that, had it
rejected this method of severance in the instant case, a tenancy by the entirety
would have been created, an estate which was not recognized in Minnesota.
However, the court did limit the severance to the remainder interest in the wife's
life estate so that she could continue in possession and enjoyment of the property
during her life, thereby serving the public policy of protecting the wife's occu-
pancy in the joint home. See id. at 691. Contrast, however, a Colorado court's
refusal to allow severance of homestead property in Knoche v. Morgan, 664 P.2d
258, 259 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)(holding that the attempt to sever was void because
of the policy behind the homestead law).
33. Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Minn.
1968).
34. See Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
35. Clark v. Carter, 70 Cal. Rptr. 923, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
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feoff oneself which, if applied, would defeat the clear intention of the
grantor."36 The opinion, a model for a reasoned overthrow of a tradi-
tional rule of property, made the following points:
(1) There was no need to use a straw man in order to create a joint
tenancy under existing California law. It seemed anomalous to re-
quire such use in order to terminate one. The inception and termina-
tion should be brought into harmony.37
(2) One joint tenant could undoubtedly sever unilaterally and was not
required to give the other tenant notice. No new powers were there-
fore being accorded to anyone by eliminating this purely formal re-
quirement. Indeed, the traditional rule had really served only to
increase the expense and trouble required on the part of the severing
joint tenant.38
(3) The four unities requirement was of a piece with other rules of the
ancient common law-the requirement of livery of seisin for example.
Almost all such "ancient vestiges" had been discarded already. This
particular holdover could therefore more appropriately join that
number.39
(4) Little reliance had been placed upon this rule of property law by
practitioners and land owners. The security of land titles in no way
depended upon it, and the oft-advanced argument against change
from reliance upon precedent therefore did not apply in this
situation.40
(5) Commentators had advocated the same step, and other courts had
taken it without apparent ill results. The California court cited the
1968 Minnesota case in support of its decision. If others had not hesi-
tated to change, why should California?41
In recent years, the same dilemma has been faced squarely in at
least four other jurisdictions. All but one have followed the pattern
set by Minnesota and California. In 1982, an Illinois court held that a
deed by one joint tenant "conveying [a] parcel of property from herself
36. Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The result was
later codified and limited by statute: CAL. CIV. CoDE § 683.2 (West 1997). It has
been held, however, that under applicable California law a different rule applies
to personal property. See Estate of Propst, 250 Cal. Rptr. 362 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988). See generally, Susan AL Channick, What's in a Name: A Critical Look at
California's System of Characterizing Marital Property, 26 CAL. W. L. REV 1, 50-
52 (1989); Nathaniel Sterling, Joint Tenancy and Community Property in Califor-
nia, 14 PAc. L. J. 927, 938-40 (1983).
37. See Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532.
38. See id. at 534.
39. See id. at 533.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 534.
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as a joint tenant to herself as a tenant in common" was an effective
severance. 42 The judge noted that "courts have been inclined to allow
severance in any variety of ways once the intent to sever has been
demonstrated,"43 and he rejected the argument that statutory repeal
of the requirement of the four unities in the creation of joint tenancies
should not be extended to their termination because of the maxim that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be construed
strictly.44 In 1991, Florida took the same step in a bizarre case in
which one joint tenant forged the other's signature in a purportedly
joint conveyance to himself; he did so in order to secure a mortgage
loan on the premises. The court held that his action, which it treated
as equivalent to a conveyance to himself as a tenant in common, in
fact severed the joint tenancy.45 Utah's Supreme Court followed suit
in 1996. Following the reasoning of the Minnesota and California
courts and also expressly overruling a prior Utah decision, 46 the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "a joint tenant may effectively sever a joint
tenancy by executing and recording a unilateral self-conveyance."47
The exception is Nebraska. In 1979, the state supreme court re-
jected the argument that was to prevail elsewhere. 48 It held that "[a]
person cannot convey or deliver to himself that which he already pos-
sesses,"49 and that the regime of the four unities persisted except
where it had been expressly modified by statute.50 The facts of the
case admittedly made an appealing argument for reaching that result.
The plaintiff, to whom the property had earlier been devised, created
the joint tenancy with an old man who had been a long-time family
friend on January 30th. Just twenty days later, this man, acting in
42. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 387 (IMI. App. Ct. 1982), affld,
447 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1983). The decision was noted and welcomed as eliminating
an "archaic construct" and properly focusing "attention on the intent to seoer
rather than the nature of the grantor and grantee" in Jeffrey W. Jackson, Volun-
tary Termination of Joint Tenancies: Illinois Eliminates the Strawman, 17 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 765, 778-79 (1984)(italics in original).
43. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 390 (IM. App. Ct. 1982), affd,
447 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1983).
44. See id. at 389-90.
45. See Countrywide Funding Corp. v. Palmer, 589 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); see also Wittock v. Ramponi, 446 So. 2d 271, 271 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1984)(holding that joint tenancy was terminated when joint tenant conveyed her
interest to herself and to a stranger to the title).
46. See Knickerbocker v. Cannon (in re Estate of Knickerbocker), 912 P.2d 969, 974-
76 (Utah 1996).
47. Id. at 976. The severing tenant recorded the unilateral self-conveyance, and the
opinion appears to require recordation in order to guard against the possibility of
fraud. Indeed, this requirement figured in the court's reasons for allowing a uni-
lateral self-conveyance to effect a severance.
48. See Krause v. Crossley, 202 Neb. 806, 277 N.W.2d 242 (1979).
49. Id. at 812, 277 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1979).
50. See id. at 811, 277 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1979).
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the company of the defendant, caused a unilateral self-conveyance to
be drawn up in favor of himself as grantee. At the same time, the old
man executed a will under which the defendant took a large share. If
effective, this would have deprived the plaintiff to whom the property
had originally belonged of the chance even to change the old man's
mind about the wisdom of severing. Although the court rejected the
allegation of undue influence by the defendant, the suggestion is
strong that the plaintiff had been treated unfairly and that the de-
fendant was to blame. The four unities allowed the plaintiff (and the
fairer result) to prevail.
What will happen in other American jurisdictions when this ques-
tion has to be faced? Predictions are risky,51 and lawyers in jurisdic-
tions where the matter remains uncertain will doubtless continue to
use the conveyance to a strawman as a matter of prudence. 52 How-
ever, it does seem more likely than not that the strength of the reason-
ing found in the recent opinions will carry the day when the question
does arise. That is the way the tide is running.5 3 The Nebraska legis-
lature itself acted quickly to reverse the 1979 decision. In 1980, it ad-
ded a "curative" provision to its statute law:
The conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or herself as
grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the joint tenancy ex-
pressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint tenancy.5 4
A similar development has occurred elsewhere in property law. In
the law of servitudes, the traditional "touch and concern" require-
ment, used to determine whether a servitude was enforceable against
successors in interest in the land, has been attacked as "encrusted
with archaic terminology,"55 and has yielded in some measure at
51. Cf. NATELSON, supra note 29, at 34-35 (stating that the unilateral self-conveyance
creates an effective severance "in a very few states").
52. See, e.g., KRATOVIL & WENmER, supra note 8, §14.02(c) at 239 (describing the Min-
nesota case that permitted unilateral self-severance as "a pretty liberal decision
and recommending that "the party deed out to a dummy and have the dummy
deed back").
53. The move is not isolated to the United States. Recent developments in Australia
point in this direction. See, e.g., Peter Butt, Severance of Joint Tenancy by Uni-
lateral Declaration: New Proposals in New South Wales, 69 AusTmRAIAN L.J. 570
(1995).
54. L.B. 694, § 11, 1980 Neb. Laws 577 (codified as NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-118(4) (Reis-
sue 1996)).
55. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1318-19 (1982); Susan F. French, Servitudes
Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural
Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928 (1988). The suggestions have not been
without controversy. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the
Law of Servitudes, 73 CoRmuEL L. REv. 883 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70
IOWA L. Rav. 615 (1985).
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least, to a test tied to public policy and intent.5 6 There has also been a
movement of opinion, though somewhat less successful so far, in favor
of abandoning the traditional test for distinguishing assignments from
subleases-by asking whether the grantor retained a reversion in
favor of an intent-based test.57
Moreover, some movement in this same direction is evident else-
where in the law regulating severance of joint tenancies. Decisions
arising in analogous situations have accepted the basic reasoning
found in the law reviews.5 8 In some other situations where the unities
have been technically breached, as happens for instance when one
joint tenant is adjudged an incompetent and the legal title to the in-
competent's property is assigned to a guardian, courts have regularly
held that no severance occurred. 5 9 Many decisions also speak criti-
cally of the antiquated character of the requirement of the four uni-
ties. They stress that the intention of the parties should control in
deciding questions of severance. 6 0 A few states have abandoned the
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:SERVITUDES §§ 3.2-3.7 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1991); see also GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS
§ 9.10 at 311 (1990)(criticizing the rule as "an unwieldy and highly confused doc-
trine, where technical application, rather than policy-based analysis, determines
results").
57. The leading case is Jaber v. Miller, 239 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1951). See also Gagne
v. Hartmeier, 611 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Ernst v. Conditt, 390 S.W.2d
703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964); Smith v. Larson, 217 P.2d 326 (Wash. 1950); Bowlby-
Harman Lumber Co. v. Commodore Services, Inc., 107 S.E.2d 602 (W. Va. 1959).
Professors Dukeminier and Krier are skeptical of this trend, and with some rea-
son. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 476.
58. See e.g., Cope v. Western Sur. Co.(!n re Matter of Robinson), 791 S.W.2d 844, 850
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(holding that joint tenant severed tenancy by his "acts, state-
ments, conduct and testimony"); Rotert v. Faulkner, 660 S.W.2d 463, 470 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983)(surrendering of note held by joint tenancy by one tenant found to be
an effective severance); Brown v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 415 N.E.2d 906, 907-08
(N.Y. 1980)(removing the name of the other joint tenant and substituting a third
person on the bank's signature card effected a severance); Stop 35, Inc. v. Haines,
543 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Pa. Super. 1988)(holding that the parties' declaration of
intent to sever their tenancy by the entirety would not be effective, but stating
that the recording of a deed to the same effect would be).
59. See Moses v. Butner (In re Estate and Guardianship of Wood), 14 Cal. Rptr. 147
(Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Moore v. Self, 473 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Odum v.
W.R. Todd (In re Estate of Brach), 395 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Miller v.
Yocum, 256 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1970).
60. See e.g., Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d 978, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)(contrasting
four unities approach to mortgages with "the more modern approach"); Mac-
Gregor v. MacGregor, 323 So.2d 35, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(disparaging "all
the neo-Platonic references in the cases to the four 'unities' which form [the] ba-
sis" for tenancies by the entirety); Hyland v. Standiford, 111 N.W.2d 260, 264
(Iowa 1961)("advocating a shift away from the four unities of the common law
and to the intention theory"); Cornell v. Heirs of Walik, 235 N.W.2d 828, 829 n.1
(Minn. 1975) ("There should be no regrets over this departure from the concept of
the four 'unities.' "); Cleaver v. Long, 126 N.E.2d 479, 482 (Ohio 1955)(stating
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four unities approach across the board.61 And dicta in other decisions
in this area support the proposition that exit from a joint tenancy
should be no harder than entry into one.6 2 There is a counter argu-
ment, to be discussed below, to the effect that unilateral self-severance
may become a tool for fraud if allowed without safeguard. However, to
the extent this counter argument comes to prevail, it seems unlikely
that it will do so because of a reverence for the formalist approach of
the four unities requirement.
B. Contracts to Sell and Equitable Conversion
Among the most formal of rules applied to joint tenancies is that
which applies the doctrine of equitable conversion to severance ques-
tions involving contracts for the sale of land. It was among the targets
of one of the comments that appeared in the law reviews and it offers a
second opportunity for assessing current developments in the law of
severance.6 3 The situation arises when all joint tenants execute a con-
tract to convey the land held in joint tenancy, and then one of them
dies while the contract is still executory. Under the doctrine of equita-
ble conversion, a contract to convey land converts the seller's interest
into an interest in personalty, normally the money proceeds from the
that there is no way to escape "wondering why the courts have dwelt at great
pains 'on the four unities' of the old common law joint tenancy").
61. See e.g., Bates v. Bates (In re Estate of Bates), 492 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1992)(Iowa does not follow the 'four unities' common law rule, which re-
quired a unity of time, title, possession, and interest in order to create (and con-
tinue) a joint tenancy."). The Bates opinion relied in part on Baker v. Cobb (In re
Baker's Estate), 78 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1956). The court in Baker had noted that
prior cases had "definitely held the 'four unities' common law rule was not appli-
cable in Iowa and the intention of the parties should prevail." Id. at 865 (citing
Switzer v. Pratt, 23 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1946)). In re Baker's Estate became a
well known case because of its use in an annotation on the subject: W.W. Allen,
Annotation, What Acts by One or More Joint Tenants Will Sever or Terminate the
Tenancy, 64 A.L.R.2d 918 (1959). See also Mann v. Bradley, 535 P.2d 213, 214
(Colo. 1975)('The modem tendency is to not require that the act of the co-tenant
be destructive of one of the essential four unities.... ."); Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W.2d
883, 885 (N.D. 1977)("[A]lthough we have recited the Blackstonian doctrine of the
four unities as a matter of history... we have never held that the four unities
were required in order to establish a joint tenancy under our law.")(citations
omitted).
62. See e.g., Mamalis v. Borovas, 297 A.2d 660, 662 (N.H. 1972)("We can see no
reason in policy or logic to adopt a different standard for the termination of a joint
tenancy than obtains for its creation.").
63. There is an annotation on this subject in Sara L. Johnston, Annotation, Contract
of Sale or Granting of Option, to Third Party, by Both or All of Joint Tenants or
Tenants by the Entirety as Severing or Terminating Tenancy, 39 A.L.R.4th 1068
(1985), but it divides cases into those which have found severance and those
which have not, without looking at the question of whether a formal test or the
intention of the parties was determinative in the outcome.
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sale. In equity, title to the land is in the buyer from the moment the
contract is signed.
When this doctrine is applied to property held by joint tenancy, it
follows (or has seemed to follow) that the contract of sale itself will
also sever the four unities and create a tenancy in common. The pre-
sumption in cases of doubt, in favor of tenancy in common over joint
tenancies, a presumption that is broadly accepted in modem Ameri-
can law, has been used to buttress this conclusion. As a Nebraska
court put it bluntly, "[c]onveyance of joint property by all the joint ten-
ants destroys the joint tenancy."6 4 In practical terms, the result is
that those who inherit from the first to die among the (former) joint
tenants share in the proceeds of the sale.
That this result proceeds from a purely mechanical application of
the doctrine of equitable conversion, and that it is not even absolutely
required by the doctrine of the four unities, has been pointed out by
many commentators and judges. They have noted that the admission
that the joint tenancy is severed as to the land being conveyed does not
require that it be severed as to the proceeds.6 5 The more appropriate
approach would be to look to the intent of the joint tenants. Was it
their intention that the contract to convey would also sever their inter-
est in relation to the proceeds? American courts have had to respond
to that question many times in recent years.
Reviewing the case law shows that overall the courts have not fol-
lowed Nebraska's lead in applying a mechanical rule-whether based
on equitable conversion or on the four unities. Both doctrines have
been discussed in cases and sometimes are taken seriously, but
neither has provided the rule of decision.6 6 An intent-based test has
controlled instead. This is true even though decisions have gone both
ways in deciding whether or not a severance in the proceeds had been
effected by the contract to convey. Indeed outcomes are bound to vary
where intention provides the rule of decision. The intent of the joint
tenants varies.
64. Buford v. Dahlke, 152 Neb. 39, 45, 62 N.W.2d 252, 256 (1954) (stating also that,
"the courts of other jurisdictions, and leading text writers, are unanimously of the
opinion that a contract to convey operates, in equity, as a severance of the joint
tenancy"). The case is noted in Lawrence L. Wilson, Note, The Effect of a Land
Sale Contract Involving Property Held in Joint Tenancy, 34 NEB. L. REv. 501
(1955).
65. See Swansen & Degnan, supra note 1, at 476 ("new and especially frightening
application"); In re Baker's Estate, 78 N.W.2d at 863, 869 (Iowa 1956)(Oliver, J.,
dissenting); Yannopoulos v. Sophos, 365 A.2d 1312, 1315 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976)(Hoffinan J., concurring).
66. It has even been possible to invoke the doctrine of equitable conversion in order to




A Maryland decision from 1966 is fairly typical of the cases that
have found a severance. 67 Two joint tenants agreed to sell a tract of
land to the State and in fact delivered a deed to the lawyer acting for
the State. However, before the deed could be recorded or the purchase
price paid, one of the joint tenants died. The State contended that the
joint tenancy had been severed and sought to recover from the estate
of the deceased the inheritance tax due from the proceeds. The trial
court disagreed, holding that the joint tenancy remained intact until
the purchase price had been paid, and that the proceeds were owed
entirely to the surviving joint tenant. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that there had been a severance. Four points were made in
the course of the decision:
(1) Admitting that there had been a severance in the land itself, the
court concluded that this was by no means determinative as to the
proceeds of the sale. A different question was raised, and the court
was obliged to attempt to determine what the parties had actually in-
tended. It stated that in such cases, "the paramount factor most often
is the intention of the parties."68
(2) Examining the language of the contract, the judge found no indica-
tion of any intent by the parties to take the proceeds as joint tenants.
The contracting parties had simply signed their names on the instru-
ment, without indicating any desire to preserve their joint ownership
in the proceeds. 6 9
(3) Noting that Maryland had a policy favoring tenancies in common,
and that state statutes required the intent to take as joint tenants to
be stated unambiguously, the judge held that it made sense to apply
this policy under the facts of the case.70
(4) No other "facts and circumstances" surrounding the joint owner-
ship of the land suggested that the parties intended to extend the ar-
rangement to the proceeds of the sale. Neither conduct nor external
circumstances stood in favor of continuation of the joint tenancy.7 1
Notable for its absence from the Maryland court's reasoning was
any application of the doctrine of equitable conversion or the four uni-
ties. The opinion did mention the latter, in noting that decisions in
other jurisdictions were divided on the question of whether the four
unities were affected by a contract to convey.72 It also took brief note
of the former, in order to show that the state held the right to the legal
67. Register of Wills v. Madine, 219 A.2d 245 (Md. 1966).
68. Id. at 249.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 250.
71. Id. at 249.
72. Id. at 247 ('The authorities have divided on whether a conveyance by all joint
tenants destroys the joint tenancy and causes the proceeds of sale to be held in
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title.73 But the opinion did not apply either doctrine in settling the
question of entitlement to the proceeds. Of course neither did the de-
cision speak at length about the ultimate question in the case-
whether the state would collect the inheritance tax.74 The court's
analysis meant that the tax had to be paid. However, at least so far as
the words of the decision reveal, that result was not reached by appli-
cation of a purely formal test. It was reached by looking to the parties'
intent. 75
Many courts have recently reached the opposite conclusion about
the factual question of whether there had been a severance by joint
tenants. However, these courts have not relied upon a purely formal
test. The cases have split in deciding what the intent of the con-
tracting parties actually was, but rarely on the doctrinal question of
whether equitable conversion or the four unities controlled the out-
come. An Indiana case from 1976 illustrates the way most of the deci-
sions finding that no severance had occurred have been framed.76
Two sisters and a brother owned 152 acres of land as joint tenants. In
October 1972, they entered into an installment contract to sell it.
When the brother died, his widow sought to secure her share of the
remaining proceeds, alleging that the sale had automatically severed
the joint tenancy. She persuaded the trial court, but the court of ap-
peals reversed. It held there had been no severance. The contract had
described the sellers "as joint tenants with right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common," and the court found this indication enough
to show that the sellers "did not intend the contract to alter their ex-
isting joint tenancy relationship."77 The court expressly held, more-
over, that "the trial court improperly used the doctrine of equitable
conversion to frustrate the intent of [the decedent] and his sisters."78
Among all the cases decided on this subject, it is true that there
have been decisions in the past forty-five years which held that a con-
tract to convey on the part of all joint tenants severed the tenancy
automatically, because of the doctrine of equitable conversion, 7 9 or be-
cause the contract necessarily destroyed one of the four unities.SO
However, they have been rarities. Few of the appellate decisions have
common or whether the four unities characteristic of a joint tenancy remained
unimpaired...
73. See id. at 248.
74. Virtually the only asset in the decedent's estate was the land involved.
75. See also In re Matter of Robinson, 791 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(rejecting
doctrine of equitable conversion where it would have been inconsistent with joint
tenant's conduct and responsibility to his mother).
76. See Hughes v. Hughes, 356 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
77. Id. at 230.
78. Id. at 231.
79. See In re Baker's Estate, 78 N.W.2d 863, 868-69.
80. See e.g., Yannopoulos v. Sophos, 365 A.2d 1312, 1315 ("The passage of equitable
title by the execution of an agreement of sale by either or both parties destroyed
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applied one of these purely formal tests. Instead, most courts have
focused on the intent of the parties.Sl It cannot be doubted, as leading
commentators have remarked, that a "split of authority" exists on the
question of whether a contract to convey automatically severs a joint
tenancy.8 2 However, the existence of this split should not obscure how
lop-sided in favor of an intent-based test that split actually is.
This result has not been without problems of its own. It has cre-
ated at least three difficulties. First, the intent of the parties in such
cases may be very difficult to determine. Thinking about severance
requires thinking about dying. Joint tenants are understandably re-
luctant to do this, and some cases have had to discover the parties'
intent from very slim evidence pointing one way or the other. To re-
quire this inquiry is an invitation to litigation in a way a mechanical
test is not. Second, the security of land titles in some measure has
come to depend on a presumption of non-severance. Where one joint
tenant has died, it has often happened that the other has gone ahead
to complete the contract to sell without joining the personal represen-
the unity of title required by joint tenancy."); see also In re Clay Estate, 264 A.2d
632, 634 (1970)(semble).
81. See County of Fresno v. Kahn, 24 Cal. Rptr. 394, 397 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1962)("The theory of equitable conversion is fictional with respect to the intent of
the joint tenants and it should not be regarded as a substitute for reality....");
Weise v. Kizer, 435 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(stating equitable
conversion "should not be applied if it defeats the intention of the parties"); Hew-
itt v. Biege, 327 P.2d 872, 875 (Kan. 1958)("[Mlere agreement by persons entitled
as joint tenants to convert their property from one species to another does not
operate to work a severance."); In re Estate of Rickner, 518 P.2d 1160, 1162
(Mont. 1974)("Mere change of form through equitable conversion does not auto-
matically change the nature of the interest."); see also Smith v. Morton, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Bradley v. Mann, 525 P.2d 492 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974), affd, 535 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1975); In re Estate of Cook, 524 P.2d 176 (Idaho
1973); Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n (T.6) v. Stelle, 153 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1958); Berto-
lami v. Corsi, 537 N.E.2d 1271 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); O'Connor v. Dickerson, 188
So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1966); In re Estate of King, 572 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
McKissick v. McKissick, 560 P.2d 1366 (Nev. 1977); Romano v. Romano, 205 A.2d
583, 587 (R.I. 1964); Estate of Phillips v. Nyhus, 874 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1994). The
cases dealing with tenancies by the entirety are analogous. See, e.g., In re
Baker's Estate, 359 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962)("We would say that in
the absence of evidence indicating a contrary intention by both parties a tenancy
will be presumed to follow the proceeds of the sale of entirety property."); Finley
v. Thomas, 691 A.2d 1163, 1166 (D.C. 1997)(stating no severance of proceeds be-
cause parties "did 'nothing to indicate a contrary intention'").
82. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAMf, ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.4 at 201 (2d ed.
1993). For case law authority to the same effect, see, e.g., Smith v. Tang, 412
P.2d 697 (Ariz. 1966). The decision contains a long discussion of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, but concludes that "the determining factor in this problem
as to whether there has been severance of a joint tenancy by conveyance of all
joint tenants is the intent manifested by the parties." Id. at 703.
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tative of the decedent.83 If the question of severance can later be re-
opened, many otherwise secure titles may be brought into dispute.
That is not desirable. Third, the question of how far a joint tenancy in
the proceeds can be carried lurks in the case law.8 4 If the joint ten-
ancy continues in the proceeds of a contract to sell land, does it con-
tinue still if the proceeds are invested in another asset, say a bank
account or shares of stock? At some point the parties must express an
intention to create a new joint tenancy if they mean to preserve the ius
accrescendi, but an intent-based test renders that point more uncer-
tain than it would otherwise be.85 It can bring problems in its wake.
C. Divorce and Severance
Like cases involving contracts to convey property held in joint ten-
ancy, cases in which the marriage of joint tenants has ended in divorce
pose continuing problems for the courts. Where no explicit decision
about the fate of the property held in joint tenancy is made during
divorce proceedings and one party to the divorce dies before the prop-
erty is sold, the dilemma is squarely presented. It turns out that vir-
tually all jurisdictions dealing with this dilemma after the 1950s have
come to rely on the approach championed in that generation's law
reviews.
Husbands and wives very often own property as joint tenants, and
the rising tide of divorce has led to an increasing number of disputes
about the question of the tenancy's survival afterwards. The tradi-
tional rule is that divorce does not sever a joint tenancy.SS This rule
by itself is, of course, consistent with the four unities doctrine, since it
is hornbook law that a divorce decree does not necessarily affect title
to land held by the divorcing couple. Some states have passed stat-
utes creating a presumption of severance upon divorce,8 7 surely a sen-
83. See, e.g., Buford v. Dahlke, 152 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954), discussed supra
note 64, but the danger exists equally with an intent-based test.
84. It is particularly problematic with joint bank accounts where either party can
easily transfer account funds. See, e.g., In re Estate of Eyer, 317 A.2d 203 (Pa.
1974).
85. See Illinois Public Aid Comm'n. v. Stelle, 153 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ill. 1958)("Complex
problems of tracing could arise. And when would a joint tenancy, once created,
end?"); see also Prather v. Hill, 250 A.2d 690, 693 (D.C. 1969)(questioning
whether joint tenancy existed in automobile purchased with proceeds of joint
bank account); In re Estate of Martinek, 488 N.E.2d 1332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)(ask-
ing whether assignees of rights under contract to purchase land in joint tenancy
also took in joint tenancy).
86. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, at § 31.08(c). For case law in one jurisdiction, see,
e.g., Shepherd v. Shepherd, 336 So. 2d 497 (Miss. 1976), holding that severance of
tenancy by the entireties created joint tenancy between former husband and wife
in the absence of contrary intent, and also Miller v. Miller, 298 So. 2d 704 (Miss.
1974).
87. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20(c)(5) (Anderson 1996).
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sible way of avoiding the problem. The courts in some states,
Minnesota for example, hold that in the absence of special circum-
stances, courts are required to settle the question of severance as part
of the divorce decree.8 8 Most states, however, have left the courts to
deal with the cases as best they might. Predictably, the results as to
whether a severance has occurred go in both directions.
Where courts hold that the tenancy is not severed, one might ex-
pect them to have used the continued existence of the four unities as a
basis for their conclusion. A few do.8 9 But most do not, even though
there is a perfect congruence between the unities test and the result
reached. In one Wisconsin dispute from 1985, for example, the opin-
ion discussed at great length whether the intent of the parties to the
divorce or the intent of the trial judge who granted the divorce con-
trolled the question of severance. 90 The opinion said nothing, how-
ever, about the effect of the four unities. Such focus on the intent of
the actors, real or presumed, at the time of their divorce, rather than
on problems raised by the continued existence of the four unities, is a
salient feature of most of the cases where the joint tenancy has
survived.9 1
Cases in which an appellate court has held that the divorce decree
had the effect of severing a joint tenancy turn out to be more numer-
ous than those that hold it survived. In them, one expects that the
four unities would be treated as an obstacle to severance-a problem
to be mentioned, discussed and perhaps purposefully set to one side.
Such cases exist. An Arizona decision of 1979 held that an agreement
to sell the property at a future time, made at the time of the divorce,
was itself sufficient to cause the destruction of the four unities "by
88. See Johnson v. Johnson, 169 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1969); see also Snyder v. Snyder,
212 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 1973); Wos v. Wos, 191 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1971).
89. See Porter v. Porter, 472 So.2d 630, 633 (Ala. 1985); Nichols v. Nichols, 168
N.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Wis. 1969).
90. Lutzke v. Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. 1985).
91. See, e.g., In re Estate of Layton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 256 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996)("The current state of the law does not permit automatic severance of ajoint
tenancy, but requires, at the very least, specific words or conduct that can be
construed as being inconsistent with holding title in joint tenancy. A status-only
dissolution judgment does not manifest sufficient words or conduct to sever a
joint tenancy."); In re Estate of Sander, 806 P.2d 545, 547 (Mont. 1991)('he rigid
requirement of the common law doctrine of the four unities are not part of Mon-
tana's statutory law on property."); see also U.S. v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1499
(10th Cir. 1995); Watford v. Hale, 410 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1982); Compton v.
Compton, 624 P.2d 345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Mangus v. Miller, 532 P.2d 368,
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Sondin v. Bernstein, 467 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984)(mentioning four unities but seemingly not relying upon them in the hold-
ing); In re Estate of Woodshank, 325 N.E.2d 686 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); In re Estate
of Bates, 492 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re Estate of Violi, 492 N.Y.S.2d
550 (1985); Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963).
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implication." 92 One Kansas judge adopted a position in accord with
common sense, if not with traditional doctrine-that a divorce decree
by itself destroyed the unity of possession and thereby caused a sever-
ance.9 3 Occasionally, a judge has faced the four unities obstacle
squarely, but has rejected its continued applicability. In a New
Hampshire decision of 1972, for example, the court discarded the rule,
in holding that "a proper expression of intention by the parties ought
to replace the historical unity rule."94 It went on to decide that al-
lowing the joint tenancy to continue would "ordinarily be in direct con-
travention of the intent of the deceased [joint tenantl." 9 5
Most of the cases involving severance upon divorce, however, have
not alluded to this theoretical problem at all. They have simply fo-
cused upon the intent of the parties to the divorce. A Colorado deci-
sion of 1982 is typical. The divorce decree contained a provision that
the land held in joint tenancy was to be used in certain ways and ulti-
mately sold under certain conditions. 9 6 Where one of the tenants died
prematurely, the court held that the provision had effectively severed
the joint tenancy because it showed that the parties ultimately in-
tended to divide the proceeds. The four unities presented no apparent
obstacle. They were not mentioned. It was intent that mattered.
Some of the cases have gone to great lengths in order to discover an
intention to sever in the acts or the conduct of the parties to a divorce.
In one, inclusion of the phrase "to settle" in a property settlement was
found sufficient to suggest an intent to sever, because of the air of fi-
nality it imported. 97 In others, judges have indulged in the supposi-
tion that it was "illogical"98 or "hard to see"9 9 or "difficult to
92. In re Estate of Estelle, 593 P.2d 663, 665 (Ariz. 1979); see also Estate of Seibert,
276 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(assuming that divorce agreement for
sale breached one of the four unities and identifying the right of survivorship as
one of those unities); Estate of Blair, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627, 632 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)(describing it as unlikely that either spouse would desire "to make the ma-
cabre gamble" of being the survivor if one party died pending dissolution); Carson
v. Ellis, 348 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. 1960)("The divorce decree has the effect of sever-
ing the unity of possession between a husband and a wife.").
93. Carson v. Ellis, 348 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. 1960).
94. Mamalis v. Bornovas, 297 A.2d 660, 662 (N.H. 1972); see also Mann v. Bradley,
535 P.2d 213, 214 (Colo. 1975).
95. Mamalis v. Bornovas, 297 A.2d 660, 663 (N.H. 1972).
96. Gaskie v. Hugins, 640 P.2d 248, 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); see also In re Estate of
Gebert, 157 Cal. Rptr. 46, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); In re Estate of Asvitt, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Estate of Dompke v. Dompke, 542 N.E.2d 1222
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); In re Estate of Coleman, 395 N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
In re Estate of Bates, 492 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Leutgers v.
Kasten, 204 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1973); Waxler v. Dalsted, 529 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.
1995); In re Estate of Steffen, 467 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1991).
97. Zulk v. Zulk, 502 N.W.2d 116, 120 (S.D. 1993).
98. Estate of Blair, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Superseded by stat-
ute as stated in In re Marriage of Weaver, 273 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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envision"1 0 0 that the parties to a divorce would wish to preserve a
form of property ownership which resulted in a "windfall" to the sec-
ond to die. But in virtually all the cases, it is an intent-based test that
is said to control.
It should of course be remembered that the law has long since dis-
pensed with the strictest understanding of the requirement of the four
unities. Severance of a joint tenancy can be accomplished by an agree-
ment of the parties to it, even if the unities themselves are not broken.
The parties to the agreement will then hold as tenants in common. As
long as such an express agreement is sufficient, it is open to joint ten-
ants to end the ius accrescendi by the kinds of agreements commonly
made in divorce cases. What is surprising today is how far that pro-
cess has gone. American courts have been willing to find that such
agreements to sever joint tenancies in divorce cases from language
that is ambiguous at best, and sometimes even from the conduct of the
parties.'O' They have not required an express agreement to sever.
Any action on the couple's part that is inconsistent with an intent to
continue the joint tenancy sometimes can serve as a substitute for an
actual agreement. American courts have come a long way from the
world of the four unities.
California adopted legislation which deals with the subject by creating a pre-
sumption that property would be held as community property upon divorce. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4800.1 (West 1992)(repealed 1994). The results, however seem not
wholly to have fulfilled the drafters' expectations. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lay-
ton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); In re Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d
891 (Cal. 1992); Allen v. Graham (In re Marriage of Allen), 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992), review granted & opinion superseded by 839 P.2d 983 (Cal.
1992). See generally Channick, supra note 36.
99. Wardlow v. Pozzi, 338 P.2d 564, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)("hard to see how two
persons in domestic difficulties, and desirous of settling their domestic problems"
would desire continuation of joint tenancy).
100. Rich v. Silver, 37 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
101. See, e.g., Robertson v. U. S., 281 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Ala. 1968)(holding that
joint tenancy in securities held by brothers "severed, terminated or abandoned
... either by the agreement of the brother or by their conduct in devoting such
securities to the partnership business"); Guilbeault v. St. Amand, No. 93569,
1993 WL 392943 at *5 (Conn. Super. Sept. 28, 1993)(concluding that severance
found when "the conduct of the parties voluntarily evidenced their intention to
sever the joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and hold their property as
tenants in common"); In re Marriage of Dowty, 496 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986)(finding that trial testimony at divorce evidenced intent to sever because
parties desired to sell and divide proceeds "as soon as reasonably possible");
Brodzinsky v. Pulek, 182 A.2d 149, 156 (N.J. Super. 1962)(finding severance
where joint tenants "by their conduct and course of dealing, mutually treated the
subject mortgages as held by them as tenants in common"). Compare In re Estate
of Layton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 255-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(holding intent not to
sever inferred from long delay and having filed a motion to sell property but not




The severance cases involving divorce, as in the other two situa-
tions surveyed, stand as clear evidence that a purely formal approach
linked to the four unities, the subject of analysis and criticism in
1950s law reviews, has largely ceased to control the outcome of Ameri-
can cases, at least where it would produce a result inconsistent with
the intention of the parties. The preponderance of cases decided since
then points strongly in that direction. At the same time, it is plainly
not true that the four unities have entirely ceased to appear in the
case law. They have been mentioned in a variety of contexts and are
likely to continue to be cited where they prove convenient.
Perhaps the overall development is best summed up in the cau-
tious approach to the subject found in a 1975 case involving the crea-
tion of joint tenancies.i 0 2 After expressly rejecting the common law
doctrine that the four unities were required by law, and after describ-
ing the traditional doctrine a "fiction" and "useless", the court none-
theless added a cautionary note. It would be "premature to do away
with the 'unities' doctrine," the judge wrote, "as its usefulness may
better be determined on a case-by-case basis."103 That is about where
things stand with relation to severance as well.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES
If, as seems to have happened, the approach to the law of sever-
ance advocated by the commentators of the 1950s has very largely suc-
ceeded in persuading courts to abandon a purely formal approach
based upon the four unities, what have been the results? That is a fair
question to put to any successful argument. At least it is fair when
enough years have passed to provide a sufficient test, and enough time
has certainly gone by in this instance.
The most obvious conclusion must be that the intent of joint ten-
ants is being carried out more fully and more often than it was under
a regime that strictly observed the rule requiring destruction of one of
the four unities or an unequivocal agreement among the tenants in
order to effect a severance. This conclusion is mostly guesswork of
course. Although it has certainly worked that way in several decided
cases, the conclusion is not subject to statistical verification. We have
no index of "joint tenant satisfaction" with severance cases, and there
is unlikely to be one anytime soon. But it does seem the more plausi-
ble consequence of the development in the case law.
There are, however, at least three less attractive consequences of
the approach that do appear in the reports. They are unintended con-
102. See Cornell v. Walik's Heirs, 235 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1975).
103. Id. at 829 n.1.
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sequences of the shift. In any fair assessment of the merit of the real-
istic approach advocated in the law reviews, these consequences
require recognition and consideration. They also raise in pointed
ways the more general question of the place of formalism in our law,
the question that was raised at the outset of this assessment and that
has also been close to the surface in the discussion within it.
A. Added Difficulties in Determining Severance Questions
One of the obvious advantages of a purely formal intent is that it
provides direct answers. An intent-based test does not. Both the di-
vorce cases and the contract for sale cases illustrate the problem.iO4
Most of these disputes arose where the parties were not thinking at all
about what would happen if one of them died. Why would they? They
assumed that the divorce would be completed or that the contract for
sale would be fulfilled. In most situations that is exactly what did
happen. But not all. Where the unexpected does happen and one
party dies, litigation all too easily ensues. In it, the courts have been
left with the task of discovering the intent of the parties from what are
very often the slenderest of indications. I make no criticism of judicial
efforts here. They have done the best they could. But it requires both
ingenuity and perspicacity to discover an intent about severance from
documents generated by parties who were not thinking about sever-
ance at all. Happy are the courts of states where the legislature has
created a statutory presumption for determining severance questions,
or at least set some exact requirements for severing a joint tenancy.i0 5
They at least have a standard from which to start. The parties can
always choose something other than that statutory standard if they
desire, and the statutory presumptions probably coincide with what
their actual intent would have been had they been required to think
the problem through.
B. Increased Possibility of Fraud
Since one joint tenant has always been able to sever the tenancy
without the concurrence or even the knowledge of the other, the possi-
104. For an instructive case wrestling with the problem in the context of a contract to
convey, see Estate of Calligaro v. Owen, 768 P.2d 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), re-
manding case for determination of intent, expressly permitting the introduction
of extrinsic evidence.
105. See e.g., Neb. Rev. St. § 76-2,109 (establishing no severance where all joint ten-
ants join in the execution of contract, "unless the intention to effect a severance
expressly appears in the instrument"). The statute was enforced, apparently to




bility of a severance that is unfair to the other has long existed.' 0 6 It
can take several forms, as where the joint tenant who has contributed
nothing to the purchase of the assets then severs unilaterally, thereby
upsetting the normal expectations of the other joint tenant. Its most
extreme form is the secret severance. If the tenant who severs
secretly is the first to die, the heirs or successors produce the severing
document and take half of the property. It accrues to them under the
tenancy in common that was the result of the severance. If the sever-
ing tenant survives, however, the severing document is suppressed
and the survivor takes the whole.1o7 The heirs or successors of the
first to die get nothing. It is what the economists call "strategic
behavior."
Although elimination of the four unities does not make this kind of
fraudulent severance possible for the first time,' 0 there can be little
doubt that it does make it easier.' 0 9 If the unilateral self-severance is
valid in law, there is less protection for the other joint tenant than
there would be if compliance with the four unities were strictly re-
quired. It was for this reason that the Minnesota court that first ap-
proved these unilateral acts stated that there might be reliance or
other action on the part of the "passive joint tenant" that might call for
a different result.1o It was also for this reason that the Minnesota
legislature subsequently amended the statute to require that such an
instrument of severance be filed in the appropriate record office."'
The Minnesota courts have struggled with these two limitations; the
results are not easy to digest. 1 12 But both are surely signs of unease
106. See Samuel Fetters, An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret Destruction of Joint
Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1986); see also Taylor Mat-
tis, Joint Tenancy: Notice of Severance; Mortgages and Survivorship, 7 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 41, 42-47 (1987).
107. See, e.g., Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 877-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(sug-
gesting that letter instructing grantee to record promptly if severing tenant died
first, but "suggest[ing] you contact me" if it was the other joint tenant who died
first).
108. See Lonergan v. Strom, 700 P.2d 893 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Carmack v. Place, 535
P.2d 197 (Colo. 1975); In re Estate of Zoglauer, 593 N.E. 2d 93 (111 App. Ct. 1992);
Gottwig v. Blaine, 795 P.2d 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
109. For judicial discussion of the potential danger, see In re Estate of England, 284
Cal. Rptr. 361, 363-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Mobley v. Sewell, 487 S.E.2d 398, 401
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Simon v. Wilson, 684 N.E.2d 791, 806-07 (111. App. Ct. 1997);
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 1996). Compare Nelson v. Davis,
592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979).
110. Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 161 N.W.2d 688, 692
(Minn. 1968).
111. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.19-5 (West 1997); see also the California parallel:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 1998).
112. See Wendt v. Hane, 401 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). One joint tenant
petitioned to partition, the other answered by asking that the property be parti-
tioned by sale. The first party then died, and the survivor moved to dismiss the
action so that she could take the whole under the original tenancy. This motion
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with the results that may follow from the decision to allow unilateral
self-severance. That decision may better fulfill the legitimate expecta-
tions of the joint tenants than did the four unities test. But it is not
without costs of its own.
C. Greater Incongruity with the Remaining Formal Rules
Rejection of the four unities requirement has not altogether rid the
law of severance of the effects of formalism. It has limited them, no
doubt, but rejection has also had one other unintended consequence.
It has brought into more prominent focus those situations, not directly
involving the four unities, in which formalism still controls the out-
come of cases. It makes them look more conspicuous. Perhaps deep
reasons of policy underlie some of them. But judicial opinions com-
monly approach these cases in just as formal a fashion as they once
did unilateral severances. This opens the result to an attack that
would not have been possible under the regime that adhered more
strictly to the four unities requirement. Incongruity appears in sev-
eral situations:
1. Void Deeds
Where one joint tenant conveys his interest to a third party, is
there a severance if it turns out that the deed is void? The law has
long been, and still is, that there is no severance. 1 13 Under the four
unities test, that result follows as a matter of course. The unities
could not have been disturbed by an action that was itself a nullity.
Under an intent-based test, however, the same result becomes a good
deal harder to justify. Any joint tenant could have created a tenancy
in common simply by making a unilateral self-severance, and the void
deed is hard to distinguish in substance from such a unilateral act. In
this situation, courts have been driven to make conclusory statements
like, "[we conclude that the void deed may not be deemed evidence of
any intent," if they are to preserve the right of survivorship.114 The
succeeded, in part because the statutory formalities for terminating the joint ten-
ancy had not been met. See also Thomson v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1420 (D.
Minn. 1994)(finding no severance where divorcing spouses failed to record under
the act allowing tax lien to be attached to property), rev'd, 66 F.3d 160 (8th Cir.
1995). The history is traced, with reference to the Minnesota cases, in O'Hagan
v. United States, 86 F. 3d 776 (8th Cir. 1996). For a California parallel, see Re v.
Re, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
113. See Chrystyan v. Feinberg, 510 N.E.2d 33, 36 (III. Ct. App. 1987)("[Allthough an
intent to sever was shown, the conveyance was void because it did not adhere to
the terms of the trust instrument and thus, was unable in law to effect a sever-
ence (sic)."); see also McBee v. Crosby, 632 P.2d 1059 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Ianotti
v. Ciccio, 591 A-2d 797 (Conn. 1991); Hayes v. Lewis, 338 N.E.2d 102 (11. App. Ct.
1975); Nelson v. Albrechtson, 287 N.W. 2d 811 (Wis. 1980).
114. Knoche v. Morgan, 664 P.2d 258, 259 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
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result seems right, but it is not derived from "realism" in discerning
what the party's intent actually was. It is a formal rule.
2. Mortgages
Where one joint tenant mortgages his interest in the property to a
lender, traditional law has dealt with the question of whether this ac-
tion amounts to a severance by applying a formal test: does a mort-
gage convey title or is it merely a lien under local law? If the former,
then there is severance; if the latter, then there is not. Most recently
decided cases have continued to use that test, and the result is that if
the mortgaging joint tenant dies first in a state where a mortgage is
only a lien, the mortgagee's interest vanishes.'1 5 Where a mortgage
constitutes a conveyance of the title, by contrast, the mortgagee
prevails. This may well be the correct approach, despite the potential
for hardship of the first theory on unsuspecting lenders.'1 6 But the
distinction between the "title theory" and the "lien theory" is very
largely a formal one,1 1 7 and it becomes increasingly hard to defend it
115. See e.g., American Nat'I Bank and Trust Co. v. McGinnis, 571 P.2d 1198, 1200
(Okla. 1977)("Since a mortgage is a mere lien or charge upon the mortgagor's
interest which does not transfer any legal title ... it does not destroy any unity
and, therefore, estate in joint tenancy is not severed and converted to tenancy in
common."); see also Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930 (Ill. 1985)(discussing the
two theories and citing authority from other states). Compare Stewart v. Am-
South Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)(holding, in a case
of first impression, that execution of a mortgage by one tenant severs, because
"Alabama classifies itself as a 'title' state with regard to mortgages"), rev'd sub
nom. Exparte AmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1996). See also Down-
ing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208, 213 (Md. 1992)(no automatic severance although
Maryland is a "title" state); First Westside Natl Bank v. Llera, 580 P.2d 100
(Mont. 1978), overruled by In re Estate of Shaw, 855 P.2d 105 (Mont. 1993);
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 301 P.2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1956). Of course,
under a lien theory, if the mortgaging joint tenant is the survivor, then to some
extent the opposite result is obtained. The mortgagee will stress the limited na-
ture of the interest conveyed and the representatives of the first joint tenant to
die will argue that a severance has occurred. See, e.g., Brant v. Hargrove, 632
P.2d 978 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
A "hybrid" solution is offered in Schaefer v. Peoples Heritage Says. Bank, 669
A.2d 185, 187 (Me. 1996)(allowing severance under title theory, but describing it
as "subject only to the right of redemption"). See generally CUNMIGHAM Er AL.,
supra note 6, at 201-02, and 4 THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 49-50, for discussion
and further citations. A fuller treatment is found in Taylor Mattis, Severance of
Joint Tenancies by Mortgages: A Contextual Approach, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27.
116. See, e.g., Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1988). For commentary and crit-
icism, see W. Tayloe Murphy, Jr., Cotenancies: a Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L.
REv. 405 (1962) and Mattis, supra note 106, at 51 (advocating protection for the
lender without severing the joint tenancy).
117. It was the subject of a memorable article of the Realist movement in American
jurisprudence, Wesley A. Sturges and Samuel 0. Clark, Legal Theory and Real
Property Mortgages, 37 YALE L.J. 691, 709 (1928), arguing that judges use one
theory or the other "depending upon [their] sense of convenience and the matters
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in an era when the intention of the parties provides the touchstone for
deciding most severance cases. One Florida judge, acknowledging
"the logic and the fairness" of the mortgagee's argument in favor of
severance, retreated to the most formal of justifications in reaching
the opposite result. The mortgagee's position was, he wrote, "at vari-
ance with the essence of a joint tenancy in real property.""i8
3. Wills
The rule that an attempt to sever by the last will and testament of
one joint tenant is ineffective has been stated by many cases decided
since the 1950s,i i 9 and it seems almost self-evidently correct. 120 The
most common justification given for the rule, however, is a decidedly
formal one: a will is ambulatory and has no effect until the testator's
death. By the time the will can take effect, the rule holds, the prop-
erty held in joint tenancy has already passed automatically to the sur-
vivor. The attempt to sever therefore has nothing upon which it can
operate.' 2 ' There is bound to be some tension between this statement
of the rule and reliance upon an intent-based test in other circum-
stances, particularly since a number of cases have allowed severance
in cases ofjoint wills, on the theory that the severance occurs by virtue
of the agreement to make the wills rather than by virtue of the wills
themselves.' 2 2 That exception obviously cannot apply where only one
which stimulate them in the particular case." Although the result today is not
normally announced in connection with the four unities, it can be. See, e.g.,
Texas Amer. Bank/Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 864, 865 (N.M. 1987)("In New
Mexico, a mortgage is merely a lien.., hence, title and joint tenant unities are
unaffected by the execution of a mortgage."), af/'d, 793 P.2d 1337 (N.M. 1990).
See generally Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV.
283, 324-29 (1987)(arguing in favor of the results reached by the lien theory in
the context of merger).
118. DALD., Inc. v. Moring, 218 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
119. See e.g., Gladson v. Gladson, 800 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. 1990); Meyer v. Wall, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 236, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); First Presbyterian Church v. Christenson,
339 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Il1. App. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 356, N.E.2d 532 (Ill. 1976); Huff. v.
Metz, 676 So. 2d 264 (Miss. 1996); Gazalski v. Goss (In re Estate of Ingram), 874
P.2d 1282 (Okla. 1994).
120. If one could sever by will, this would create an advantage no matter the outcome,
since one would inherit the whole if one survived the other joint tenant(s), but
also be free to devise half to one's own successors if one did not.
121. See e.g., Hyland v. Standiford, 111 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 1961)("A will speaks
only from the death of the testator. The death of a joint tenant terminates his
interest and leaves no part of the joint tenancy property subject to his will.").
122. Compare Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 377 A.2d 1315, 1320 (R. I. 1977) (finding sev-
erance) with Powell v. American Charter Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n 245 Neb.
551, 559,, 514 N.W.2d 326 (1994)(finding no severance). See also Olson v. Rei-
simer, 170 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Wis. 1959)(severance), rev'd, 271 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1959); In re Estate of Waks, 386 So. 2d 307 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Matter of
Ciochon's Estate, 609 P. 2d 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). The law on this subject
seems (to the author of this Article at least) to be an almost hopeless muddle.
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tenant's will is at issue. The incongruity in such cases seems particu-
larly poignant. Nothing could have been stated more definitely than
the one tenant's intent to sever. It is a reason imported from the law
of wills and stated in a formal rule about the inherent nature of wills,
not fulfillment of the joint tenant's expectations, that is said to pre-
vent this from happening.
4. Partition
Where joint tenants petition for partition of the property (or take
any equivalent step towards severance for that matter), but one of
them dies before the petition can be acted upon, does the survivor take
the whole? The cases are virtually unanimous that there is no sever-
ance in this circumstance. The survivor does take the whole. Only if
the partition is carried through to its conclusion does a severance oc-
cur.1 23 Although it may be said in favor of this rule that the parties
might always have changed their mind before the final decree, that
seems a poor justification in the face of their clearly expressed intent
to sever and the untimely death of one of them. The true reason for
the rule must be a formal one: the rule is necessary in order to safe-
guard the integrity of the underlying action for partition. Partition
cannot be effective before it is obtained. One cannot secure the results
of a judicial action simply by asking for it. Put that way, the result
seems right, even inevitable. But to an enthusiast for the intent-
The Nebraska case contains a revealing, if slightly mysterious, judicial comment
on the subject. See Powell v. American Charter Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n., 245
Neb. 551, 559, 514 N.W.2d 326, 333 (1994)("After a review of our own cases, we
recognize that we have contributed to the confusion between property which is
subject to the terms of a will and property which is devised pursuant to the will,
[citing cases]. To the extent that these cases imply that a testator may change
the method of transferring property held in joint tenancy by the language in his
will, these cases are incorrect."); see also Wilcoxen v. U. S., 310 F. Supp. 1006,
1010 (D. Kan. 1969)(distinguishing wills by one tenant from wills by one tenant
to which the other had given her consent, and treating only the latter as severed).
Apparently contra are Coffey v. Price, 380 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1963) and Anderson v.
Anderson, 450 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1971)(decided under Oklahoma law). There is
a brave effort to reconcile the cases in Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
1046, 1049-51 (1982).
123. See Cobb v. Gilmer, 365 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Erdman v. Sowle, 485
P.2d 1392 (Kan. 1971); Minnehan v. Minnehan, 147 N.E.2d 533 (Mass. 1958);
Heintz v. Hudkins, 824 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Stiff v. Stiff, 184 Neb.
432, 434, 168 N.W.2d 273, 275 (1969); Sheridan v. Lucey, 149 A.2d 444 (Pa.
1959); Allison v. Powell, 481 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Keidel v. Keidel,
383 A.2d 264 (R.I. 1978). Compare O'Brien v. O'Brien, 391 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1976)(allowing severance where "mere formalities" remained to be completed
and both parties had sought partition).
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based approach to questions of severance, the rationale must ring a
little hollow.124
5. Bankruptcy
These cases arise when one party to a joint tenancy files a bank-
ruptcy petition and then dies before administration of the bankrupt's
estate can be taken up or a discharge secured. The question is
whether the petition itself severs or whether, instead, the other joint
tenant succeeds to the whole free from the bankruptcy process. The
bankruptcy courts are split on the outcome. Some have found a sever-
ance. 125 Some have not.1 26 What unites them is their entire disre-
gard of all questions of intent. One can see why. Bankrupts rarely
have any intent at all as to severance, at least any intent that can be
discerned after their death. Discharge and a fresh start are on their
minds, not the possibility of dying. The words and policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the classification of joint tenancies under state law,
such as they are,127 have therefore provided the only tools available
for judicial analysis. They are undeniably formal in character. If one
looked honestly at the filer's probable intent, had he given it any
thought, the severance would occur at the moment of filing. But this
has not happened.
6. Leases
"Like a comet in our law," the existence of this problem has long
been recognized, although it comes into view only from time to
time.128 The question is whether a lease by one joint tenant works a
severance. The answer is said to have been disputed since the fif-
teenth century,1 29 and there seems to be little hope of its resolution
124. See Allison v. Powell, 481 A.2d 1215, 1218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)(Cavanaugh, J.,
concurring)("It is only the event of his death prior to the final decree, and not that
the petitioner has changed his mind, that prevents the severance."). Compare
the statements commonly made in divorce cases to the effect that "[a]n agreement
to sever itself operates to effect a severance, and the intervening death of one of
the joint tenants will not defeat the severance even though the agreement is not
performed." Thomas v. Johnson, 297 N.E.2d. 712, 714-15 (IM. App. Ct. 1973).
125. See In re Lambert, 34 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Tyson, 48 Bankr.
412 (Bankr. C.D. IM. 1985); Feldman v. Panholzer (In re Panholzer), 36 Bankr.
647 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984).
126. See In re Anthony, 82 Bankr. 386 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); Durnal v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. (In re DeMarco), 114 Bankr. 121, 123 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va.
1990).
127. See, e.g., Whittington v. Gilbralter Say. & Loan Assoc. (In re Spain), 55 Bankr.
849 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
128. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1976). See generally John A- Soder-
gren, Comment, Consequences of a Lease to a Third Party Made by one Joint Ten-
ant, 66 CAL. L. REv. 69 (1978).
129. 2 AimmcEAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.3, at 10 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
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today. The recent decisions are as inconsistent as the early English
cases.1 3 0 On the one hand, a short term lease is likely to end before
the death of the leasing tenant, and there is therefore no inherent ne-
cessity of finding a severance. On the other hand, it is possible that
the lease will last longer, and if it does the lessee will be ousted if no
severance is found, since the non-leasing tenant will take the whole by
right of survivorship.iSi Courts have to make a choice, and the inten-
tion of the parties or other "realities of the situation" can be of little
help to them.1 3 2 It was not by accident that the California decision
which faced the problem ended its refusal to uphold the rights of the
lessee, despite the admitted hardship to him and the apparent viola-
tion of the leasing tenant's intent, by saying, "we cannot allow extra-
neous factors to erode the functioning of joint tenancy. The estate of
joint tenancy is firmly embedded in centuries of real property law and
in the California statute books."133 Identical words could once have
been written about the four unities.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, examining the case law dealing with the law
of severing joint tenancies decided since the 1950s leads to a mixed
conclusion. On the one hand, most of the immediate goals of the com-
mentators seem to have been achieved. The four unities have ceased
to control the outcome of virtually all the recent cases involving the
specific problems they addressed, even though the unities continue to
be mentioned in decisions when they coincide with a result that would
be reached on other grounds. The unities have retained a staying
power in the intervening years, but they have not been harmful in any
real sense. To this extent, the aims of the law review commentators
have been accomplished, and this can be counted a real victory over a
purely formalist approach.
On the other hand, formalism has not disappeared from the law of
joint tenancies. To the extent that this was the goal of the law review
130. Compare Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)(no severance)
with Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359 (Md. 1969)(severance). See also Walk v.
Miller, 650 P.2d 1286 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)(ambiguous).
131. A third possibility is to find a "partial severance" in which the joint tenancy
would revive if the lease ended before the death of the leasing joint tenant. See
generally Charles H. Matthews, Jr., Joint Tenancy in California Revisited: A Doc-
trine of Partial Severance, 61 CAL. L. REv. 231 (1973).
132. See, e.g., Swenson & Degnan, supra note 1, at 474 (taking the position that find-
ing a complete severance would be the best result since it would be in line with
the more likely intent of the lessor). But see KRATOViL & WERNER, supra note 8,
§ 14.02(c), at 240 (arguing that "court decisions holding that a lease severs a joint
tenancy are absurd"). All authors have acknowledged that what authority there
was on the point did not unambiguously support either conclusion.
133. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 337 (Cal. 1976).
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articles, they have enjoyed much more limited success. Indeed the law
of joint tenancies seems to have been unable to get along without for-
malism. It is even difficult to see how the law could dispense with
formalism. There must be a way to decide whether a void deed, a
mortgage, a will, a pledge, a petition in bankruptcy, an action for par-
tition, or a lease operates to sever a joint tenancy, and it is very hard
to conceive of any test but a formal test that will provide an answer.
At least no other has been discovered so far. Looking to the intent of
the parties, or relying on "realism" to deal with the situation, simply
will not answer the question being posed. Occasional judicial at-
tempts to break the bonds of formalism in these areas seem only to
make matters worse. 34
The law review commentary of the 1950s may thus have been suc-
cessful in clipping the wings of the four unities and the purely formal
approach they embody, but their efforts have not removed the hand of
formalism from the law of severance of joint tenancies. At least in this
corner of American jurisprudence, formality has continued to be a
"fundamental characteristic of law."135 "Realism" itself suggests that
this characteristic is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
134. See, e.g., Harris v. Crowder, 322 S.E.2d 854, 855 (W. Va. 1984)(Neely,
J.)(attempting to balance "the ineluctable logic of received property law" with
"common humanity and sound public policy"). This opinion and associated
problems are discussed in John W. Fisher, Joint Tenancy in West Virginia: A
Progressive Court Looks at Traditional Property Rights, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 267
(1988).
135. The phrase is taken from The Formal Character of Law, Summers, supra note 9,
at 260.
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